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TRANSFERRING POLICYMAKING POWER TO JUDGES-
THE EFFECT OF JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS-IS NOT A DEFENSIBLE
ALTERNATIVE TO MAJORITY RULE
LINo A. GRAGLIA*
In Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution,' John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport tackle nothing less than the
basic problem of government: how to keep it from serving pri-
vate interests rather than the public interest. Government-the
grant of power to some people to exercise coercive force over oth-
ers2 --is infinitely dangerous;' unorganized individuals do not
commit genocide or impose mass famines.4 Why have govern-
ment, an instrument of coercive transactions, when voluntary,
free-market transactions are necessarily mutually beneficial and
therefore wealth-increasing? The answer, at least in economic
terms, is that because of "market defects," free markets do not
always operate to increase wealth.5
McGinnis and Rappaport point out that a basic purpose of
government is to correct one of these defects by making possible
the production of "public goods" that the market cannot produce
easily. These goods include national defense or the rule of law,
* A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Consti-
tutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 365 (1999).
2. See Virginia Elizabeth Richards, Our Money For Your Rights: Conditional
Spending As A Restraint on Liberty, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 1165, 1175 (1992) (noting
that government has a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive force).
3. Lino A Graglia, Transcript, The Goldwater Institute and the Federalist Soci-
ety: Federalism and Judicial Mandates, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 17, 48 (1996) (arguing that
because government is dangerous, we should try to have as little of it as possible).
4. See, e.g., Thomas W. Simon, Defining Genocide, 15 WIS. INT'L L.J. 243, 248
(1996) (explaining that the proposed refinement of the Genocide Convention's defini-
tion of genocide rules out a single individual committing genocide).
5. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 376 (arguing that government
can provide some goods more efficiently than the market).
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which once produced, benefit everyone, including those who do
not contribute to their cost.6 Government is necessary to over-
come this "free-rider" problem by coercing contributions.7 Gov-
ernment may also be necessary to deal with negative
"externalities," such as air and water pollution, that result from
productive activities, when the number of people involved is so
large that transaction costs preclude settling the problem by
private contracts.8
Once government is established for these good purposes, how-
ever, individuals will be tempted to use it to obtain subsidies,
that is, to extract wealth from others.9 An inherent defect of
democratic government, or at least of the American version of
democratic government, our authors argue, along with Milton
Friedman and many other conservatives, is that subsidy or
"rent-seeking" private interests often have advantages that en-
able them to prevail over the public interest.' ° Special interest
groups, such as sugar producers or the elderly, may by concen-
trated effort be able to obtain a subsidy that is enormously bene-
ficial to each member of the group, but not sufficiently harmful
to the general public to bring forth effective resistance." To
some extent, the people are trapped in what is known in game
theory as a prisoner's dilemma: it is in the interest of each group
to expend efforts to obtain a subsidy, although everyone would
be better off if there were no subsidies. 2 The inevitable result,
the argument goes, is a national government that spends more
money than a majority of the people want it to spend. 3
It is this problem that is the basis of the always nearly, but
never quite, successful movement for a Balanced Budget Amend-
6. See id at 376-78.
7. See id at 377 (stating that a citizenry with a "universal preference" for elimi-
nating poverty would be unlikely to succeed because it would lack the power to co-
erce free riders).
8. See i&. at 377.
9. See id. at 378-79 (positing that members of groups that possess a dispropor-
tionate amount of power in the political process will spend time and money securing
and protecting their subsidies).
10. See id. at 379-80.
11. See id. at 379.
12. See i&. at 372.
13. See id. at 398 n.150.
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ment to the Constitution that would prohibit deficit spending
except in certain emergencies. 4 It is also at least partly behind
the movement for campaign finance reform, which would limit
campaign expenditures and individual contributions, and for
term limits. 5 Both would help counter, their proponents believe,
the advantages of special interests. The Balanced Budget
Amendment, however, our authors point out, would not limit
spending in general, but only deficit spending, which Congress
could avoid by raising taxes or printing money.' 6 Campaign fi-
nance reform, at best a very indirect means of limiting spending,
is often popular with legislators primarily because it tends to
protect incumbents. 7 The media and academics find campaign
finance reform attractive primarily because it enhances the pow-
er of opinion makers over the power of money."
McGinnis and Rappaport believe they have a better idea: lim-
iting spending by requiring a legislative supermajority."9 They
do not propose a simple supermajority requirement for the pas-
sage of every spending bill, however, because that would create
serious "holdout problems."" A supermajority requirement
means that a minority of legislators can defeat a measure, which
in turn means that a legislator who would ordinarily vote for it
would have an incentive to withhold his vote unless he obtains
some concession. 1 McGinnis and Rappaport therefore propose a
two-part plan.22 First, they would require supermajority authori-
zation in order for Congress to be able to spend in any year
more than ninety percent of what it spent in the prior year. 3
Second, they would require a moderate supermajority of three-
14. See id at 399.
15. See id- at 398.
16. See icL at 405.
17. See id. at 465 n.390.
18. See icL at 467.
19. See id. at 400.
20. See i& at 406.
21. See i at 404 (arguing that holdouts have more leverage under supermajority
rules "because there are fewer other legislators with whom the majority can bargain
to form a supermajority coalition").
22. See hL at 406.
23. See fid
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fifths or two-thirds to pass bills that enact or expand an entitle-
ment program.24
I agree with McGinnis and Rappaport that the national gov-
ernment probably spends much more than most people want it
to and that the nation would be better off, economically and so-
cially, if its spending for what appears to be private interests
rather than the public interest could be reduced. Indeed, per-
haps the most encouraging thing about our present situation is
that it could be easily improved by the simple expedient of re-
pealing most of what Congress has done in the past five or six
decades. We have been improving our situation for some years
by a process of undoing the works of the New Deal. 5 We could
improve it more by accelerating that process-for example, by
overhauling Social Security-and applying it as well to much of
the post-New Deal, such as the Great Society. The repeal of
most or all federal entitlement programs would almost surely be
a contribution to human welfare, if only because such programs
can be handled better by the states. 6
I have my doubts, however, that the McGinnis and Rappaport
proposal is the answer to the problem of excess federal spending.
For the same reason that they say the holdouts problem pre-
cludes a supermajority requirement for all spending bills, I
think it likely that it also precludes their proposal. They argue
that although entitlement measures, too, "are subject to
holdouts, they are far less vulnerable than appropriation
bills ... [biecause the entitlement program ... is not yet in ex-
istence, [and] the public does not yet rely on [it]. "2' There is,
therefore, "much less pressure to enact it by a specific date."28
Congress can avoid the holdouts problem, they say, by "simply
postpon[ing] the establishment or expansion of the program un-
24. See id.
25. See Harry H. Wellington, Term Limits: History, Democracy and Constitutional
Interpretation, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 833, 837-38 (1996).
26. See Steven M. Dawson, The Promise of Opportunity-and Very Little More:
An Analysis of the New Welfare Law's Denial of Federal Public Benefits to Most
Legal Immigrants, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1053, 1072-73 (1997) (arguing that allowing
states to experiment with welfare programs will produce long-term benefits).
27. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 422.
28. Id.
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til a more convenient time."29 Major entitlement programs, how-
ever, are the result of ardent and sustained effort,"0 making it
doubtful, I would think, that such programs can easily be post-
poned once they are on the legislative agenda or that there ever
will be a "more convenient time."
Similarly, I disagree with McGinnis and Rappaport when they
claim that under the ninety percent rule, "holdouts would have
much less leverage" than if every spending bill required a
supermajority. 31 Congress could again avoid the supermajority
requirement and thus reduce the leverage of holdouts, they ar-
gue, by simply keeping spending below the ninety percent ceil-
ing that brings the requirement into play.32 They contradict this
assertion with their later argument that although "a simple ma-
jority could always choose to avoid the supermajority require-
ment" by simply not exceeding the ninety percent limit, "[tihe
existence of this option ... is unlikely to reduce the leverage of
the antispending minority significantly because the majority
generally would deem a reduction in total spending of more than
ten percent to be extremely undesirable."33
It is not easy to see why the unacceptability of restricted
spending in order to avoid a supermajority rule in the case of an
antispending minority would not also make that option unac-
ceptable in the case of holdouts. Our authors respond that al-
though legislators would find the ninety percent limit unattrac-
tive for the whole year, they would not deem it unattractive as a
temporary measure.34 The resolution requiring a supermajority
will, however, eventually have to be passed and, as our authors
concede, holdouts would have leverage at that time.3 5
At this point, matters become complex. Holdouts would use
their leverage, McGinnis and Rappaport state, to attempt "to
acquire some power over the content of individual spending
29. I&
30. See generally MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS (1981) (explain-
ing the role of interest groups on the passage of legislation).
31. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 423.
32. See id.
33. Id at 426.
34. See id. at 426 n.241.
35. See id at 426.
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bills."3" To do this they would have to refuse "to approve spend-
ing resolutions until the budget process was structured to confer
some credible information to them about the content of federal
spending." 7 The budget process could be structured by having
the resolution come early or late in the legislative session.3"
They recognize, however, that either option presents serious
problems for the minority's attempt to exercise some control over
the content of spending bills.39 Their attempt to deal with these
problems is too complicated to discuss here or, I would imagine,
to be workable.
McGinnis and Rappaport's basic notion is that a superma-
jority rule can be seen as "a third decision-making rule," along
with majority rule and constitutional restraints ("absolute limi-
tations") enforced by courts.4" Majority rule has much to be said
for it-at least more than our authors, like most intellectuals,
are willing to admit.4' It is how legislators ordinarily make deci-
sions. Again, however, it is subject to the defect of permitting
disproportionate influence by special interest groups,42 which
actually operates to defeat majority rule.43 Although it is tangen-
tial to their argument for a supermajority rule-and a subject
with which they may lack expertise-our authors also believe
that there are some circumstances in which decisionmaking, in
restraint of and contrary to the will of elected legislators, is best
left to courts." This occurs, in their view, when three conditions
are met:
36. Id at 424.
37. Id.
38. See id at 424 n.239.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 400-01.
41. See id. at 455-60 (explaining that democracy is not necessarily a good idea).
42. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
43. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreward: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1984) (explaining that
laws that benefit the citizenry in common are hard to enact because smaller groups
are more effective lobbyists).
44. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 435-36 (contending that absolute
limitations work well when the courts can be called on to protect an activity the
nation wants to protect).
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First, there must be a category of activity that society
wants to protect absolutely. For instance, some individual
rights are plausible candidates for such protection. Second, a
determinate principle must be available to carve out the cate-
gory for protection. Freedom of speech has turned out to be a
relatively determinate principle.
Third, no matter how determinate a principle is as an ab-
stract matter, it also must be one which the courts are capa-
ble of enforcing neutrally. Thus, also it must be the kind of
principle that courts can apply using distinctive jurispru-
dential methods, including interpretation through text, struc-
ture, purpose, history, and reasoned elaboration. Courts also
must have the incentives to apply the principle neutrally.45
A more compact compendium of error than this parroting of
standard law professor rationalizations for government by judg-
es would be difficult to find.
It happens, first, that there are no categories of activity that
society wants to "absolutely protect," whatever that might
mean.4 6 "All rights," Justice Holmes once noted, "tend to declare
themselves absolute to their logical extreme."'7 Nonetheless,
they "all in fact are limited," he pointed out, "by the neighbor-
hood of principles of policy which are other than those on which
the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough
to hold their own when a certain point is reached.""8 Freedom of
speech is certainly not in any such absolutely protected category;
speech obviously can be and is limited in many ways. 9 Second,
it would be difficult to think of an area of the law that yields
less of a "determinate principle" than freedom of speech. As
45. Id. at 436.
46. See Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Soci-
etal Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 329, 391
(1989) (explaining that there are no absolutely protected freedoms).
47. Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994) (providing criminal sanction for perjurious
statements); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that constitu-
tional protection of speech ends "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action");
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (upholding state statute
prohibiting use of "fighting words").
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Alexander Hamilton objected in regard to the analogous guaran-
tee of freedom of the press, no one can say what it means and it
would seem to be more appropriate as a moral exhortation than
as a provision of a code of laws.5 °
Third, there are no principles that judges are "capable of en-
forcing neutrally" by using their alleged "distinctive jurispruden-
tial methods, including interpretation through text."51 The use-
fulness of law professors lies in their disabusing the public of,
not spreading, such nonsense. Problems requiring decision arise
not from a failure to discern the applicable "determinate princi-
ple," but from a clash of principles; that is, a clash of interests
recognized as legitimate. They can be solved not by "neutrally"
enforcing a determinate principle, but only by making value
judgments.52 Judges are not in possession of any "distinctive ju-
risprudential methods"; they have no means of deciding the poli-
cy issues involved in controversial constitutional cases that are
not available to everyone else.
There is no greater fallacy in constitutional law than the no-
tion that the Supreme Court decides constitutional questions-of
individual rights, free speech, or anything else-by "interpret-
ing" the Constitution.53 This should be evident enough from the
fact that ordinarily there is almost nothing to interpret. The
great majority of cases involve state law, not federal law,54 and
nearly all of them purport to turn on a single sentence of a sin-
gle constitutional provision, the Fourteenth Amendment, and
indeed, on four words, "due process" and "equal protection."55
Which word do McGinnis and Rappaport think Justice
Blackmun was interpreting in Roe v. Wade,56 "due" or "process"?
50. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 580 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
51. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 436.
52. See Hudson Water Co., 209 U.S. at 357 (explaining that judges must continu-
ally balance and reconcile constitutional principles).
53. See Lino A. Graglia, "Constitutional Theory': The Attempted Justification for
the Supreme Court's Liberal Political Program, 65 TEX. L. REV. 789, 789 (1987);
Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" The Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REv.
1019, 1022 (1992); Lino A. Graglia, Romer v. Evans: The People Foiled Again by the
Constitution, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 409, 410 (1997).
54. See id
55. See id
56. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Supreme Court justices cannot and do not decide anything
"neutrally,"57 whatever that might be thought to mean. The Con-
stitution precludes very few policy choices that American legisla-
tors are likely to make, therefore the only thing judges have to
decide in so-called constitutional cases is whether to exercise
self-restraint and let the legislators' policy choice stand or suc-
cumb to the temptation to substitute their own policy preferenc-
es.5" Finally, it is worth noting that it was not the Supreme
Court, but Congress, that "greatly expanded the Commerce and
Spending Clauses during the New Deal," 9 if in fact they were
"expanded." The Court merely allowed Congress's policy choices
to stand.6" As I have explained elsewhere, it is difficult to see
how they could have properly done otherwise. 1 Why would
McGinnis and Rappaport prefer to have Justice Souter, rather
than elected congressmen, decide how and on what money is to
be spent? Fortunately, none of all this humbug is crucial to the
argument of the article. Reflecting a more realistic view of the
appropriate role of judges, our authors correctly criticize propos-
als for a balanced budget amendment on the ground that it
would necessarily grant judges a high degree of discretion, that
is, policy-making power.6 2 A prime virtue of their proposal is
that it seeks to minimize such discretion. Because of its com-
plexity and other reasons, I am not sure that they have entirely
succeeded. In any event, their proposal does involve judges in
national fiscal matters to some extent.6 3 The last thing the coun-
try needs at this time is any such enhancement of judicial pow-
er. It simply will not do to have the national government's
spending and budget decisions made or influenced in any degree
by majority vote of the nine electorally unaccountable lawyers
comprising the Supreme Court.
57. See Graglia, supra note 55, at 411.
58. See id. at 410-11.
59. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 437.
60. See Lino Graglia, United States v. Lopez: Judicial Review Under the Com-
merce Clause, 74 TEX. L. RFV. 719, 738-40 (1996).
61. See id
62. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 1, at 449.
63. See id. at 442 (noting, however, that the courts have far less discretion mak-
ing decisions under supermajority rules than in deciding individual rights cases).
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We no doubt need a means of limiting federal spending, and it
may be that this will require or be aided by a constitutional
amendment.64 If so, the amendment should make clear that all
issues arising under it are to be considered, like some other con-
stitutional issues, purely "political questions"; that is, questions
not subject to judicial resolution. The effectiveness of such an
amendment would rest entirely on the good faith of congressmen
and the President, and on the fact that it would provide a potent
weapon to opponents of spending in congressional debates and
in election campaigns. A clear denial of a role for judges in the
budget process would also indicate a much needed determination
to solve our problems through the political process prescribed by
the Constitution and carry on as best we can without the aid of
judges.
64. See David Lubecky, Comment, The Proposed Federal Balanced Budget Amend-
ment: The Lesson from the State Experience, 55 U. CiN. L. REV. 563, 582-83 (1986)
(explaining that a balanced budget amendment is necessary to promote greater fiscal
responsibility at the federal level).
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